



Speech by the Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson
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Check against delivery

Planning for the unknown

You have just seen a dense snapshot from the activities that the Swedish Armed Forces is undertaking. We are on duty 24/7, every day during the year. We can act rapidly whether it is at home, in our geographical vicinity or far away from Sweden. We are able to do this thanks to our devoted personnel. Highly skilled men and women who have chosen a job with the objective to make a difference and who care.

Right now, the Swedish Armed Forces is in the midst of a dynamic transformation. Almost two years ago, on July 1st 2010, Sweden closed a 109 years old chapter in its history. Since that date national conscription is idle. Instead we are creating a rapid reaction operational organization which is based on voluntary recruitment, an all-volunteer force.

What made the Swedish parliament and government come to the conclusion that it was time to make this change? The overarching answer is: The world of today is changing and globalization means that society faces ever-new challenges. Events can occur and change very fast. And there are fewer purely military threats today. Many other aspects are intertwined with the military dimension of today's crises and conflicts. Given the complex nature of the new challenges, as everybody today accepts, no one can meet or solve them alone. They have to be dealt with together with others. The Swedish Armed Forces is one of the tools in the Swedish security policy tool box. Among the other tools you find for example diplomacy, trade policy, energy policy and environment policy.

Sweden has, as you are well aware of, a long tradition of participating in different international operations. Actually, the Blue Berets were a Swedish invention, since the then UN Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld took the initiative to UN Peace Keeping forces. Given the fact that the Swedish Armed Forces should be able to defend Swedish interests and values as democracy, human rights and free trade also abroad, we are actively participating in different international operations.

Our main ongoing deployments are ISAF and KFOR. The current Swedish contribution to the NATO-led KFOR mission is approximately 70 soldiers. The Swedish contribution will be reduced to around 60 personnel in April 2012 and the Swedish contribution to KFOR will be phased out at the end of 2013.

These current and upcoming numbers are modest if you compare to earlier Swedish military contributions to KFOR. Sweden has been participating in KFOR since 1999, and during the first years of the KFOR-mission the Swedish contingent consisted of a mechanized infantry battalion with around 850 troops. During the years, the Swedish military contribution has been reduced. This has been possible given the fact that the situation in Kosovo has been stabilized. And a benign environment is pivotal for developing security and democracy.

The evolution in Kosovo is a proof that the chain security-development has worked. This is also mirrored in the coming Swedish contribution, which after 2013 will focus on advisory teams within Security Sector Reform (SSR). The Swedish Armed Forces also aims to keep a few positions within NATO Advisory Teams (NAT). Hence, also in the future the Swedish Armed Forces will contribute to the long term construction of a democratic society.

Sweden is participating in the NATO-led ISAF mission with approximately 500 troop in northern Afghanistan. The Swedish contingent is supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their development and operations.

In mid-March the Swedish-led PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) handed over the lead of the PRT to a civil Swede. At this moment the PRT changed name to a TST – a Transition Support Team. This handover is an important signal to both the Afghans and the international community that the transition of the security responsibility to the Afghan authorities is an ongoing and irreversible process.

The Swedish military contribution will, accordingly to a parliamentary decision, stay at 500 troop this year and then gradually reduce to around 200 troop in 2014. After 2014, the objective is to focus on the continued support the Afghan National Security Forces on education and training.

In March last year, the Swedish Parliament took the decision that Sweden, from the 1st of April during three months should participate in the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector (OUP). The base for the parliamentary decision was UN-resolution 1973.

On the 4th of April, Transfer of Authority took place. Eight Gripen fighter aircraft and one C-130 T for Air to Air refuelling, based at Sigonella Naval Air Station, together with Liaison Officers in the chain of command, started to fly missions to enforce the No Fly Zone. The Swedish Parliament later extended the mandate to the 24th of October focusing on recce missions with five Gripen fighter aircraft. One Information Operations team was added to support the NATO Command in Naples.

Last time the Swedish Armed Forces participated with fighter aircraft in an international peace-support operation was in Congo 50 years ago. It is pivotal that all parts of the military services have experiences from operating within multinational force structures. And this is maybe even more important right now in Sweden, whilst we are undertaking our own military reform. Also, by participating together with other nations under a UN Mandate, Sweden contributes to the international community's crisis management efforts.

Contributing to the international community's crisis management efforts is a multifaceted task. In a peace-support operation, very often many different aspects have to be embraced by the operation. One of these aspects is gender.

One might ask what gender and equality have to do with peace and military operations. I would argue that it is absolutely fundamental that a secure environment consists of both men and women. Women make up half of the population in any conflict area, and are – as always – the ones who are crucial making the society functioning properly. Therefore both men and women are needed to build a peaceful and long term

sustainable society. Gender is furthermore an aspect that greatly contributes to our understanding and accomplishments when it comes to peace-building and construction of a civil society.

In order to increase knowledge and capability around the issues of gender and UN Resolution 1325, the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations outside Stockholm was founded in January this year. My intention for the Centre is that it should build a hub of knowledge and expertise.

This development on the crises management arena shows that the role of the Swedish Armed Forces is affected by a changing world. In order to understand the magnitude of the transformation and the challenges ahead, I want to give you a broader picture of what has been and of what we have ahead of us:

During the 20th century a massive anti-invasion force based on conscription, demobilized in peace time, matched the threats at that time. The threats during the cold war were mainly of military nature and the potential adversaries were well defined. It was NATO versus the Warsaw Pact.

As I already have mentioned, today's threats are very different to those we dealt with before 1989. In a globalized world threats are more difficult to define since they very often consist of a combination of different factors that at a first glance not always seem to interact. Many actors today are non-state actors. Mostly, the threats today are not of a pure military nature, instead they are multifaceted, with military and civilian or even climatic components intertwined. But they can become a threat against our security when different factors interact.

We should also keep in mind that flows of information, financial and economic assets, goods, diseases, energy, pollution, and people move very fast today. And the flows are borderless just as today's and tomorrow's threats are. In order to handle the new type of threats, nations have to cooperate. I dare to say that no nation is able, and will be able, to prevent and tackle this type of challenges alone.

One of the biggest challenges today and tomorrow is to predict how the future will develop. What we know for sure is that our predictions are less sure than before. How many of you thought that the tragic self-burning of a fruit salesman in Tunisia would be one of the releasing factors of an Arabic spring? And how many of you would have imagined the economic and financial crisis in Europe if I had asked you some years ago? Probably very few of us could imagine the development and consequences of these two events.

Yes, it is hard to forecast, especially the future. But we should do what we can to adapt to a new situation. The Swedish Armed Forces tasks, which are given to us by the parliament and the government, have always been linked to the development in world affairs. When they change, our tasks also change.

Today we need versatile, usable forces with increased operational effectiveness and flexibility that can solve tasks at home, in our vicinity and further away. This type of new force has to be able to interact with different players, inside as well as outside Sweden.

The transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces has been ongoing since the year 2000. The fact that conscription was left idle since July 2010 is a part of the last phase of transformation in this process.

Our transformation journey can be described in three different phases and I would like to underline that during these phases the Swedish Armed Forces has reduced the quantitative number of units in favour of increased quality and availability. You should keep in mind that the Swedish Armed Forces during earlier eras could mobilize one tenth of the population, around 800 000 troop.

You should also keep in mind that Sweden during the end of the 1990-ies and during the first years of this millennium interpreted the security policy changes in our geographic vicinity as a benign development. Hence, focus for the Swedish Armed Forces was then to contribute to international crisis management and the national defence planning was more or less put on hold.

Events in our vicinity, like the war in Georgia in 2008 anyhow showed the difficulty in taking a certain security situation for granted. Today, we are working intensively with national defence planning, but the so called strategic time out during the end of the nineties and beginning of this millennium has meant that we have a lot of work to do.

The current national defence planning gives us also a good basis for analysing our operational requirements, as capabilities, equipment and skills, for the coming decades.

Phase 1: 2000-2004

During this phase, the Armed Forces went through a force reduction, given that the force structure still was mainly fitted to meet the situation before 1989. The force reductions during this period took into account the need to adapt the structure to a new situation. The main vehicle for this transformation was the NATO PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). The result of the force reduction was a reduction of the Army with 70 percent, the Navy with 50 percent and the Air Force 25 percent.

Phase 2: 2005-2009

During these years, focus was on multinational operations and territorial over watch. The vehicle for this transformation was the EU Battlegroup concept. Sweden was the framework nation for the Nordic Battlegroup 2008 in which also Finland, Norway, Estonia and Ireland participated. The Swedish force reductions during this period were: the Army 50 percent, the Navy 50 percent and the Air Force 25 percent.

Phase 3: 2010-2014

During the present phase, focus is on how to defend national interests' home and abroad combined with availability and usability. The main vehicles for the now ongoing phase are the Nordic Defence Cooperation – NORDEFECO, and pooling and sharing among the EU-partners. During the first half of 2011 Sweden was, once again, the framework nation for the Nordic Battlegroup. The force reductions during this period are: the Army 25 percent, the Navy 25 percent and the Air Force 25 percent.

As you can note, cooperation with others has been an important driver in our transformation process. As an EU-member, Sweden is an active member state in

developing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Hence, it is more than logic that Sweden twice has had the responsibility, the framework nation, for a Battle Group.

Sweden is also a partner to NATO and a member in Partnership for Peace (PfP), which makes it possible for us to cooperate with NATO on different issues. When it comes to developing capabilities and interoperability, pivotal assets for a defence based on a rapid reaction force-structure, NATO is the international organization that sets the framework.

In today's economic crisis, most countries' defence budgets will be reduced or unchanged. Procurement of military equipment is expensive, and very often the costs for military equipment increases more rapidly than other equipment and goods. This situation makes more and more nations interested in pooling and sharing resources. This also goes for Sweden.

Working together with other nations to find more cost effective solutions and looking for synergies aiming at increasing the capability is necessary. Cooperation is facilitated if the involved countries know each other well and have much in common. This is the reason for why we work closely with our Nordic neighbours, but also inside the European Union.

From a military standpoint I see many possibilities to increase the cooperation between different nations. When talking about pooling and sharing resources we should keep in mind that this means both give and take. This might be challenging, since we have to change our mind sets and be ready to skip some capabilities in order to get something else.

National identity markers are involved in this kind of questions, which implies that decision making in this field is not always easy. Another challenge in pooling and sharing is national legislation. For historic reasons, legislation in the defence area is linked to the nation state. It will take a while to change this conceptual thinking, but it is necessary to avoid red tape if pooling and sharing should be efficient.

So what will the result of our transformation be? We will have finished the ongoing transformation in 2019. By then the organization is manned and equipped with personnel and equipment jointly exercised. In 2019, the Swedish Armed Forces will consist of a troop strength of 50 000 with high readiness. In 2009, the year before conscription was left idle, the troop strength was 65 000 with a lower readiness compared to the reformed Armed Forces which we are in the midst of building up.

The 50 000 personnel will consist and 22 000 in the Home guard and 28 000 troop in the regular units. As I mentioned in the beginning the new manning system is based on voluntary engagement only. In the framework of our ongoing transformation the conscripts are successively replaced by regular and reserve NCO's (Non Commissioned Officers), soldiers and sailors.

In 2019 we will have around 6 600 full-time soldiers and sailors in the lower ranks—most of them serving in the Air Force or in the Navy, given that those two services have

the main responsibility for our territorial over watch, and around 9 500 part-time soldiers and sailors in the lower ranks– mainly serving in the Army.

The full-time and part-time NCO's, soldiers and seamen are offered a time-limited employment up to 8 years, with an option to extend another 4 years. All full-time personnel are, if needed, obliged to deploy in international missions, given that the Armed Forces should be able to defend Swedish interests both home and abroad.

This personnel reform with an all- volunteer force is a tremendous change for the Armed Forces, since we actively have to recruit the soldiers and sailors and compete with other employers on the labour market. The Armed Forces have initiated a dialogue with the parties on the labour market in order to find win-win solutions for both the Armed Forces and for the employers. The government has recently put forward legislation to the parliament, which, from 1st of July this year, regulates the rules for our reserve soldiers and sailors. I welcome this coming legislation, which I believe will facilitate for both the employers and the employees.

When we are recruiting personnel, our objective is to represent the entire spectra of the Swedish society with a broad representation of the population. We are looking for the adequate skills and the most talented, and not to sex, religion or colour. While we now are actively recruiting personnel, I am happy to note that many women show interest for the Swedish Armed Forces. Here I have to admit that we until now have not been successful in getting the women to stay with us. For the time being, about 5 percent of our military personnel are female. This is a failure, and something we have to constantly work on.

But which security policy environment could be expected in 2019 when we have finished the ongoing transformation? As I already have mentioned several times tonight, it is utterly difficult to predict the future in today's ever changing world. But I believe we have to follow closely some certain tendencies and developments that would be of importance.

The economic and financial crises in Europe will have broader consequences than just in the economic and financial areas. Our common EU-project might be tested, included our solidarity among the member states. We cannot exclude economic protectionism, and neither can we exclude socio-economic tensions inside the member states. This might have security policy implications.

The economic crisis also affects the United States. Reduced US military spending combined with an increased American interest in the Pacific area, mean that Europe not any longer can take the US engagement in Europe for granted. Europe will need to take more responsibility for her own security.

We also have to take into account the developments in our geographic vicinity as a whole – which means both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic area. In both areas we note a dynamic military and strategic development. The Russian build-up of military capabilities consists of conventional arms as well of nuclear arms.

Very limited military actions in such a compact security environment can end up in unknown consequences. This goes even more for a globalized world, where the changes can occur very rapidly.

I believe that we have to follow the developments in Russia closely. Today, it is difficult to forecast how the economic crisis will affect Russia whose economy is so dependent on exporting raw materials. But what we know is that Russia is undertaking a military reform aiming at more versatile, usable forces with increased operational effectiveness and flexibility. Russia is allocating resources in order to increase its military capabilities. However, this fact should not be interpreted as a current military threat.

Threat is a sum of political will and military capabilities. Right now signal intelligence and other types of intelligence activities together with cyber operations are the biggest threats against either Sweden's long term capability development or as possible weapons in low intense/non-military operations. In the near future, more robust, large-scale military threats are not very likely in our neighbourhood.

Energy resources will most probably be a more and more important security policy factor. The Baltic Sea will be of increased importance for Russian energy transports, especially now when the gas pipeline Nordstream is in use.

Our geographic neighbourhood is marked by economic drivers and a relatively small military presence. In a globalized world, the dynamic environment in our geographic vicinity will be more difficult to predict. The ability to use the Swedish Armed Forces rapidly and flexible in order to stabilize our vicinity is crucial.

If you take all these factors into account, you can see that future capabilities planning for the Swedish Armed Forces are an exciting but challenging task. If you then add the fact that the Swedish Armed Forces have to phase out several old materiel systems and introduce several new ones during the coming 15 years, you understand the challenge to choose the right ones. The different systems should also be able to interact since the Armed Forces consist of a system of systems. The new systems should be adequate to meet the threats ahead but also protect our men and women using them. The Swedish Armed Forces should also choose systems that give bang for the bucks.

Our budget is balanced, and will be so until 2015. We will continue to rationalize and make the Armed Forces more efficient by different means, for example increased cooperation with other nations. But if we should maintain our present capabilities after 2015, we need an increased budget. We are now in the last phase of our analysis, which soon will be sent to the government, of defining how much money the Swedish Armed Forces would need in order to be able to maintain our present capabilities. Then, of course, it is the parliament and the government who will decide and define the future tasks for the Swedish Armed Forces. The Swedish Armed Forces welcome a continued dialogue both with our politicians and the Swedish opinion concerning our future tasks and capabilities in a rapidly changing world!

I have tried to give you an overview of the ongoing and upcoming work in the Swedish Armed Forces. It is an exciting but also challenging process we are in the midst of. It is

a transformation that concerns not only the Swedish Armed Forces itself. In an interdependent society as the one in Sweden, this is something that concerns us all.

The Swedish Armed Forces care. Do you care?

Thank you for your attention!